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ABSTRACT
The thesis studies different kind of adversarial attacks on Convolutional Neural
Networks by using -ERCOT- electric load data set in order to fool deep neural networks.
With the improvement of Deep Learning methods, their securities and vulnerabilities have
become an important research subject. An adversary who gains access to the model and
data sets may add some perturbations to the datasets, which may cause significant damage
to the system. Six types of adversarial attacks are used and compared to each other for this
research. As mentioned, these attacks can damage systems and private information of
individuals, and even cause larger attacks. In the related study, a convolutional neural
networks model was established by converting electrical load forecasting data sets into the
images. The established model can be used not only on this data, but also can expanded it
to other applications. With the implementation of the adversarial attacks, the accuracy
value has been greatly affected, showing the security vulnerability of artificial intelligence
systems that include convolutional neural networks. The aim of this research is to find out
how these attacks affect state-of-the-art accuracy and how vulnerable convolutional neural
networks can be. A comparison of various attack strategies is carried out with comparison.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND THESIS OUTLINE
With the increase of machine learning applications, cyber-attacks on these
applications have also increased in recent years. Even if the machine learning models are
used in many fields including transportation and communications, social media, product
recommendations, dynamic pricing, and fraud detection, they are still vulnerable to cyberattacks [1].
Numeric vectors are accepted as inputs by Machine Learning algorithms [2]. When
an input is designed in a particular way to obtain the incorrect result from the model, it can
be called an Adversarial Attack. Adversarial Attacks applied to Machine Learning models
are one of the cyber-attacks. When machine learning models become very sensitive to
minor changes in inputs and in Machine Learning security, exploiting this sensitivity in
order to change the algorithm’s behavior is a major issue, and may cause significant
damage to the system [3]
Adversarial examples can be dangerous for computer systems based on
convolutional neural networks to perform data processing and analysis. For instance, a
computer program that reads handwritten numbers can wrongly interpret them as belonging
to a different number [4]. In addition, adversarial examples have the potential to fool a
content filter that is present on a website. A user may publish content that is in violation of
the guidelines for that website; but, if some adversarial noise was applied to the image, the
content filter could not appropriately identify that image as being in violation of the criteria.
These attacks may also be used in the real world, but with considerably less effectiveness
1

because of the environment in which they are used. For example, stickers and painted "trap"
stop signs allowed Eykholt et al. [5] to manipulate stop signs and cause them to fail. The
signs were misinterpreted as ‘Speed Limit 45’ signs, which is their intended categorization.
Deep Neural Networks could not learn as humans see and have difficulty detecting harmful
data.
Adversarial attacks can be classified into two categories: targeted and untargeted
attacks. The goal of a target class owned by the targeted attack is to make the dataset
misclassified by creating adversarial examples. On the other hand, the untargeted attack
does not have a target class to misclassify the image. The goal of an untargeted attack is to
make the classifier give an incorrect result [6]. It has been shown that while untargeted
attacks are not as effective as targeted attacks, but they require less time. Even though
targeted attacks are more useful in changing the model’s predictions, they are costly in time
[7].
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze different gradient-based adversarial attacks
on a convolutional neural networks model designed to classify whether data from ERCOT
[8] belongs to West Station or Far West Station and to showcase how much attacks may
affect the model.

We explore the effect of adversarial attacks on Deep Learning model and give an idea
for future work in order to design more robust models that could resist adversarial attacks.
The main contribution of this work is as follows:
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•

The effects of six types of gradient-based adversarial attacks, including FGSM [9],
BIM [10], PGD [11], Deep Fool [12], One Pixel [13], Sparse Fool [14] are
provided.

•

It is shown how previously proposed adversarial attacks mathematically affect the
classifier and how much they affect the accuracy of the model.

Chapter two discusses related works and the background and introduces briefly the
background of adversarial attacks and describes in detail the six gradient-based attacks
used for the experiment. Chapter three introduces convolutional neural networks. Chapter
four describes the images how the data is converted to the images to be used as a model for
all attacks. Finally, in chapter five, the experimental results are described and followed by
future work and a conclusion.
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CHAPTER TWO
BACKGROUND OF ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS AND
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
Since the work of Szegedy [15], many strategies to create adversarial examples
have been developed. Most strategies work by minimizing the distance between an image
and its adversarial counterpart, which causes the classifier to misclassify the data. Many
strategies use the gradients of the model to determine the perturbations required to generate
an adversarial example.
The first adversarial example, presented by Szegedy, made use of the fact that
neural networks are vulnerable to minor perturbations in their inputs. They hypothesized
that the explanation was due to high non-linearity within the neural networks layers,
resulting in a ‘blind spot’ within the training part.
The authors looked for exposing this blind spot utilizing box-constrained L-BFGS
to minimize the following cost function with respect to 𝑟.
𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠(𝑓(𝑥 + 𝑟), 𝑙) + 𝑐. |𝑟|
Equation 2.1

In the Equation 2.1, the original image is represented by the variable 𝑥, adversarial
perturbations added to the image is represented by the variable 𝑟, which guarantees to stay
in the range [0,1], 𝑙 represent the target class and 𝑐 balances the distances between images
and predictions. The authors were able to use this technique to maximize loss in the model
and derive optimal perturbations for a convolutional neural network.
4

Many researchers have developed a number of strategies to create adversarial
examples since its beginnings. They all have the same purpose in order to fool a classifier
while breaking the proposed defenses. Image misclassification is the topic of at least
twenty adversarial attack techniques at the time of this writing [16]. This thesis concentrats
on rapid, gradient-based attacks despite the variety of adversarial attack methods. This is
because it is not feasible to use most of these methods since the strongest attacks take a
long period of time to compute and apply to the images. Instead, this thesis focuses on Fast
Gradient Sign Method [9], Project Gradient Descent [11], Deep Fool [12], One Pixel [13],
Sparse Fool [14] and Basic Iterative Method (Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method) [10]
used to attack the images and focuses on a comparison of the success of these attacks on
convolutional neural networks. For the experiment, the background of selected six different
gradient-based attacks is described in the following sections.
2.2 Fast Gradient Sign Method
With the Fast Gradient Sign Method, or FGSM Szegedy et al. [15] have built on
the prior work in which they theorized that the success of adversarial attacks is due to the
strong non-linearity of the convolutional neural networks. Instead, Goodfellow et al. [9]
show that the linear behavior of a neural network’s layer in high dimensional spaces of the
network’s layers is more than sufficient to generate adversarial examples. Because of the
linear structure of these networks, the authors say, a modest input can increase linearly
overall of the input dimensions, resulting in a substantial change in the output. They refer
to this as “accidental steganography” and conclude that if the input has a high enough
dimensionality, any networks can have adversarial examples [9].
5

Linear models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks since they allow a perturbation
to multiply with high dimensionality in the input data set. Equation 2.2 provides an
explanation for this behavior. Using an image with an 8-bit channel, Goodfellow et al.
demonstrate how a simple adversarial example could be created in the article. It is expected
that any change in a pixel value smaller than the precision of the image, which in this case
is a pixel value less than 1/255, would have no effect on how the classifier classifies an
image. This indicates that as long as ||𝜂||∞ < 𝜖, where 𝜖 is the maximum possible value
under the precision and the perturbation 𝜂 , the classification outcome should be unaffected.
Theoretically, this modification should be rejected. Nonetheless, in high dimensional
spaces the perturbation 𝜂 will be multiplied by the weight vector 𝜔, which has high
dimensionality 𝑛 and has the same average magnitude 𝑚. If the perturbation is selected to
be sign (𝜔), this will cause the activation to expand by as much as 𝜖𝑚𝑛. To put it another
way, should the extremely small perturbations be designed to cause to maximize the loss
in input 𝑥, these perturbations will accumulate and cause a significant change in the output
of the model.
𝜔𝑇 𝑥̃ = 𝜔𝑇 𝑥 + 𝜔𝑇 𝜂
Equation 2.2

Because of this linear behavior, Goodfellow et al. were able to develop a rapid and
cheap method to generate adversarial examples by utilizing the gradient of the model. The
FGSM could be used to generate adversarial example 𝑥′, as shown in the formula below.
𝑥 represents the original image, 𝜖 represents the amount by which the pixel intensity should
be shifted. ∇𝑥 𝐽 represents the gradient of the loss with respect to the input 𝑥, the vector of
6

true labels is 𝑦, 𝜃 represents the vector of model parameters, and the cost function of the
model is 𝐽(𝜃, 𝑥, 𝑦).

𝑥 ′ = 𝑥 + 𝜖. 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(∇𝑥 𝐽(𝜃, 𝑥, 𝑦))
Equation 2.3

This equation makes it easier to generate adversarial examples for highdimensional inputs. The principle of the FGSM is to maximize the loss function with
respect to the input for the purpose of impact on the activations within the model’s layers
by changing just the input. In this technique, the model’s other parameters remain constant
while the input is updated. In the Figure 2-1, an example of FGSM attack in action on an
image from the dataset used in this research is shown. Due to the adversarial noise, this
data belongs to the West Station, this image is misclassified as Far West Station.

2.3 Project Gradient Descent

Project Gradient Descent or PGD which is another kind of adversarial attacks used
in this thesis [11]. It was developed by Madry et al. in attempt to produce the most resistant
deep learning model feasible against first-order adversaries. A first-order adversary
possesses first-order knowledge of the network being attacked, which means that it has
access to the model’s gradient and can maximize the loss relative to the model’s input.
Additionally, FGSM is a first-order adversary, but PGD is a far stronger attack than FGSM.

7

Original Image

FGSM Adversarial Noise

Classification: West Station. at:0.009

Adversarial Image
Misclassification: Far West

Figure 2-1 The first image which belongs to the West Data misclassified as the data of
the Far West Station because of the FGSM attack.
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This is because PGD is known as an iterative version of FGSM or I-FGSM, with the main
difference being that PGD begins in a tiny ‘ball’ area surrounding the gradient relative to
the input [17].

When it becomes to result, PGD is considered a constrained optimization problem
because, while it takes steps, it checks to ensure that it does not move outside of the L-ball,
which is often an 𝐿∞ or 𝐿2 ball. The difference in pixels between the adversarial image
and the original image is the L-ball, where the difference is measured in pixels. The 𝐿2 ball
represents the distance between the original image and the adversarial image in terms of
the Euclidean distance. The 𝐿∞ distance indicates the difference between the largest pixels
in the images. If the gradient steps performed throughout the process lead outside of the Lball, the result must be reflected to the constrained area. The purpose of adhering to this
limitation is to protect the adversarial image from being too visually different from the
original image. This constraint ensures the creation of the adversarial example, which fools
the neural network but seems to viewer to be the original class.

Equation 2.4 shows the PGD. PGD is different from FGSM because PGD computes
the gradient of the cost function just once and then applies the transformation. PGD moves
in tiny steps, computing a new gradient for each step. It adds a little perturbation to each
pixel in the input at each step. As a result, PGD is the most effective method for
determining the maximum of the loss function, which makes PGD a stronger attack than
FGSM and explains why Madry et al. say that it is a ‘universal’ first-order adversary,
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implying that a neural network resilient to its attacks is also resistant to all other first-order
attacks.

𝑥 𝑡+1 = Π𝑥+𝑠(𝑥 𝑡 +𝛼.𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(∇

𝑥 𝐽(𝜃,𝑥,𝑦)))

Equation 2.4

𝑥 𝑡+1 is the image with current time step 𝑡, 𝑆 represents the perturbation distance
from 𝑥, the constraint is Π𝑥+𝑠 that must be reflected, and α is the small perturbation. The
remaining terms are the same with equation for the FGSM.

2.4 Deep Fool

The Deep Fool was created by Moosavi et al. [12] as a way to generate minimal
perturbations in order to misclassify the data and determine the resilience of neural
networks against adversarial attacks. Since DeepFool attack is an untargeted attack, it does
not force the input to be in a specific class. These two attacks are motivated in the paper:
the need to develop a more straightforward and precise approach for evaluating robustness,
as well as the desire to construct an image with more ideal, less noticeable perturbations.

The DeepFool attack is theoretically fundamental. Starting with a binary
classification problem:
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑤 𝑇 𝑥 + 𝑏

Equation 2.5
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The authors assumed that the nature of neural networks is linear, and the DeepFool
attack splits the class space into hyperplanes and projects the current input onto the current
class, i.e., the class space closest to the current class. Known as the minimum perturbation,
they end up dramatically surpassing this value in order to generate an adversarial example.
The result is an image that is practically indistinguishable from the original image due to
the fact that the adversarial perturbations have been designed to be as minimum as possible.
This technique also includes an iterative strategy in order to account for the non-linearity
of neural networks, which is repeated until an adversary is created. It is proven to generate
an adversarial example by using the 𝐿2 norm in an iterative process until
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑓(𝑥)) ≠ 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑓(𝑥 + 𝑟))

Equation 2.6

where 𝑟 is the smallest amount of perturbation required. The authors also suggest that their
method could be expanded to the multiclass classification and claimed that their approach
could be used with the 𝐿∞ norm as well. The DeepFool attack was able to generate
adversarial examples using smaller perturbations compared to GoodFellow, because the
average perturbations were five times smaller than the perturbations of the FGSM attack.
As a result, The DeepFool computes a more optimal adversarial perturbation and can be
considered as one of the sophisticated attacks.

2.5 One Pixel
In a One Pixel attack, it is necessary to maliciously alter an image’s classification
from its original label to the target model by manipulating a single pixel [13]. The One
11

Pixel attack is detrimental to the ability of Deep Learning model-based information
systems to provide a high level of performance guarantee. In certain cases, modifying just
one pixel in an image might cause the classification of the image to be changed to an
irrelevant label, resulting in performance degradation of Deep Learning model-based
applications and even more significant effects. So, the classification of images is altered to
completely unrelated labels with the single change of a pixel [13]. The explanation of
above, generating adversarial images can be defined as a constraint-based optimization
problem. The authors assume a vector where each scalar element containing one pixel
represents an input image. 𝑓 which receives 𝑛-dimensional inputs is the target image
classifier (𝑥 = 𝑥1 , … . . 𝑥𝑛) and 𝑡 is the correct classification of the original image. 𝑥’ s
probability belonging to the class 𝑡 is thus 𝑓𝑡 (𝑥). The vector 𝑒(𝑥) = 𝑒1 , … . . , 𝑒𝑛 represents
an additive adversarial perturbation in accordance with the input vector 𝑥, the target class
adv and maximum modification restriction 𝐿. The aim of the adversaries in the targeted
attacks is to discover the optimal solution 𝑒(𝑥)∗ to the following problem:
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒

𝑓𝑎𝑑𝑣 (𝑥 + 𝑒(𝑥))

𝑒(𝑥)∗
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜

||𝑒(𝑥)|| ≤ 𝐿
Equation 2.7

The problem means identifying two values: 1) Identifying the dimensions that need
to be perturbed and 2) The strength of the alteration for each dimension that corresponds
to that dimension. The authors described their approach that is slightly different is showed
in the Equation 2.8 where 𝑑 is a small number taken as 𝑑 = 1 for One Pixel Attack.
12

𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒

𝑓𝑎𝑑𝑣 (𝑥 + 𝑒(𝑥))

𝑒(𝑥)∗
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜

||𝑒(𝑥)||0 ≤ 𝑑
Equation 2.8

Previous studies frequently alter a part of all dimensions, however in this technique
just 𝑑 dimensions are modified, with the remaining dimensions of 𝑒(𝑥) being set to zeros
in all other dimensions.

2.6 Sparse Fool

The Sparse Fool Attack which is introduced by Dezfooli [14] is inspired by
geometry that uses of the low mean curvature of the borders to compute adversarial
perturbations in a fast and efficient manner. The 𝑙𝑝 minimization adversarial perturbations
are the most frequent form of adversarial perturbations for image classification tasks
because they are the easiest to evaluate and optimize. The authors define as adversarial
perturbation, for a provided classifier and an image 𝑥𝜖 ℝ𝑛 , the smallest perturbation 𝑟
which causes the predicted label 𝑘(𝑥) 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑟 to be such that:

min||𝑟||𝑝 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑘(𝑥 + 𝑟) ≠ 𝑘(𝑥)
Equation 2.9

Most known adversarial attack algorithms are able to address the optimization
problem. When perturbations are sparse, the goal is to lower the amount of perturbed pixels
13

required to deceive the network. This corresponds to reducing the value of ||𝑟||0 in the
Equation 2.9. For NP-hard problems, there is no guarantee that a global minimum could be
reached generally [18]–[20]. There are several approaches [20], [21] to avoid this
problem’s computational burden, the most popular of which is the 𝑙1 relaxation, the
equivalent convex 𝑙1 problem may be used to approximate the minimization of ||𝑟||0 under
linear constraints [22], [23]. So, the authors seek an efficient technique to take advantage
of such relaxation in order to solve the optimization problem in Equation 2.9.
After addressing the optimization problem’s generic form, sparse adversarial
perturbations can be produced as:
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒

||𝑟||1

𝑟
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜

𝑘(𝑥 + 𝑟) ≠ 𝑘(𝑥)
𝑙 ≤𝑥+𝑟 ≤ 𝑢
Equation 2.10

where 𝑙, 𝑢 𝜖 ℝ𝑛 denote the lower and upper bounds of the values of 𝑥 + 𝑟, such that 𝑙𝑖 <
𝑥𝑖 + 𝑟𝑖 ≤ 𝑢𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, … 𝑛. Since the authors look for a quick and effective resolution of the
problem, they concentrate on the decision boundary’s geometric properties, especially on
its curvature.
The color green in Figure 2-2 denotes the 𝑙2-Deep Fool adversarial perturbations
generated after each iteration [14]. The method converges after two rounds, with a full
14

perturbation of 𝑟 = 𝑥 (2) − 𝑥 (0) . The minimum perturbation 𝑟 is modified by projecting the
current datapoint 𝑥 (𝑖) onto the predicted hyperplane using the 𝑙1 projection method:
|𝑤 𝑇 (𝑥 (𝑖) − 𝑥𝐵 )|
𝑟𝑑 ⟵
. 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑤𝑑 ),
|𝑤𝑑 |
Equation 2.11

Where 𝑑 represents the index of the highest absolute value of 𝑤 for which there has
not been a previous use.
𝑑 ⟵ 𝑎𝑟𝑔 max | 𝑤𝑗 |
𝑗∉𝑆

Equation 2.12

Right before going to the next iteration, the authors confirm that the values of the
subsequent iteration 𝑥 (𝑖+1) are correct. As a result, they utilize the projection controller
𝑄(. ) , which realigns the out-of-bounds values of the updated point by projecting 𝑥 (𝑖) +
𝑟 onto the box-constraints specified by 𝑙 and 𝑢 and the new iteration 𝑥 (𝑖+1) becomes
𝑥 (𝑖+1) ← 𝑄(𝑥 (𝑖) + 𝑟). It is worth noting that the boundaries 𝑙, 𝑢 are not restricted to
representing an image's dynamic range but may be generalized to satisfy any equivalent
constraint. Algorithm 1 is a summary of the algorithm that can be used to clarify the
linearized problem.

15

Figure 2-2 The illustration of Sparse Fool method [14]
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Algorithm 1: SparseFool
Input: image x, projection operator Q, classifier f .
Output: perturbation r
1. Initialize: 𝑥 (0) ← 𝑥, 𝑖 ← 0
2. while 𝑘(𝑥 (𝑖) ) = 𝑘(𝑥 (0) ) 𝒅𝒐
3. radv = DeepFool (𝑥 (𝑖) )
4. 𝑥𝐵𝑖 = 𝑥 (𝑖) + 𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑣
5. 𝑤 (𝑖) = ∇𝑓𝑘(𝑥 𝑖 ) (𝑥𝐵𝑖 ) − ∇𝑓𝑘(𝑥 𝑖 ) (𝑥𝐵𝑖 )
𝐵

6.
7.
8.
9.

(𝑖)

𝑥
= 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟(𝑥 (𝑖) , 𝑤 (𝑖) , 𝑥𝐵 , 𝑄)
𝑖 ⟵𝑖+1
end
return 𝑟 = 𝑥 (𝑖) − 𝑥 (0)
(𝑖+1)

2.7 Basic Iterative Method (BIM)
The Basic Iterative Method aims at extending FGSM’s logic [10]. Using a
smartphone, the researchers illustrate how adversarial examples may fool a neural network
in a real-world scenario. This method generates samples, by means of applying FGSM 𝑘
times with a small size 𝑎 ≥ 𝜖/𝑘 and each step’s feature values are clipped to make sure
that they do not go beyond 𝜖 of the source example, which means that the values were
higher than the maximum perturbations threshold of 𝜖. This method is also referred to as
the Iterative-FGSM or IFGSM. BIM is showed mathematically in Equation 2.13 [10].
0
𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑣
=𝑥

𝑁+1
𝑁
𝑁
𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑣
= 𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑥,𝜖 {𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑣
+ 𝜖. 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(∇𝑥 𝐽(𝜃, 𝑥𝑎𝑑𝑣
, 𝑦)}

𝑥 ∶ 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡
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𝑥𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑣 ∶ 𝑛 𝑡ℎ 𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒
𝑎 ∶ 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑥,𝜖 ∶ 𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑥 𝑎𝑑𝑣 > 𝜖, 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝜖 > 0
Equation 2.13

The final adversarial examples were created after several iterations of the technique were
performed.
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CHAPTER THREE
CONVOLUTIONAL NEURAL NETWORKS
In this chapter, the neural networks and its terminology are briefly explained, and
some examples are given.
3.1 Perceptron
The development of neural networks and the area of deep learning originated with
hard approximation for how the brain processes [24]. An enormous number of neurons and
synapses collaborate to accomplish the brain's duties and tasks that are required. It is
helpful to begin with the simplest version of a neural network, a perceptron, which
represents a single neuron, in order to better explain large neural networks.
When a neuron gets fired, a stimulus generally triggers it and signals are being sent
to the neuron's axon to another neuron's dendrites, which is known as synaptic
transmission. After, the new neuron can activate and induce another neuron gets to be fired,
performing the process again in the system. A perceptron graphically is represented in
Figure 3-1.
An input vector of real-valued inputs is passed to a perceptron, which calculates a
linear combination of these inputs and then outputs either 1 if the result is larger than a
certain threshold, or -1 if the result is less than that threshold. Furthermore, given a set of
inputs 𝑥1 through 𝑥𝑛 , the perceptron computes the output 𝑜(𝑥1, … 𝑥𝑛 ),
𝑜(𝑥1, … 𝑥𝑛 ) = {

1,
−1,

𝑖𝑓 𝑤0 + 𝑤1 𝑥1 + 𝑤2 𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝑛 𝑥𝑛 > 0
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
Equation 3.1
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Figure 3-1 A model of a neuron that places an emphasis on the structure that links the
axon and the dendrite [25].
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where 𝑤𝑖 is a real-valued constant or weight that specifies the contribution of each input 𝑥𝑖
to the perceptron output [24].
The amount (−𝑤0 ) is the threshold that must be exceeded by the weighted
combination of inputs 𝑤1 𝑥1 + ⋯ +𝑤𝑛 𝑥𝑛 for the perceptron to output 1. This process can
be seen in the Figure 3-2.
3.2 Multilayer Perceptron

The perceptron model that has been looked at so far can only shows linear
hypotheses. To surpass linearity, it can be looked at the multilayer perceptron (MLP),
which is a generalization of the perceptron and what most people call a neural network.
The focus of this discussion will be on the fully linked feedforward MLPs, also called the
standard or vanilla MLP. Other neural networks, such convolutional neural networks, may
be made to operate as special cases of the ordinary MLP, as shown in the following section.
The network of perceptrons that composes an MLP can be seen in Figure 3-3 [26]. In
addition, if it is considered each perceptron to be a "neuron," it can be understood where
the term "neural networks" came to be used. The terms "nodes" and "neurons" will be used
interchangeably in the following discussion of perceptrons. A first "hidden layer" of
perceptrons is provided with the inputs, with each perceptron receiving each input
individually (where does "fully connected" come from?). After that, each perceptron's
output is sent through a non-linear thresholding function.
In order to make a neural network more comprehensive, fully connected layer can
be stacked fully connected layers. By doing so, the approximation quality of the neural
21

Figure 3-2 The graphical representation of a perceptron.
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Figure 3-3 Depicts the network of perceptrons that constitutes an MLP.
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network may be increased. However, the number of stacked linear fully connected layers
does not matter, a linear model would be the result. Non-linearity can be achieved by
applying threshold function such as ReLU [27], tanh or sigmoid [28]. By definition, an
activation function determines whether or not to activate ("fire") a neuron. It introduces
non-linearity into a neuron's output. Without activation functions, a neural networks is
nothing more than a linear regression model [29] .

The ReLU function is the threshold that is most used in practice today [30]. It is
defined as:

𝑅𝑒𝐿𝑈(𝑥) = {

𝑥,
0,

𝑖𝑓(𝑥) ≥ 0
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

Equation 3.2

Sparsity is a result of ReLU [30]. It also correlates into more models with increased
predictive ability and reduced noise or overfitting. Neurons are more likely to interpret
significant information in a sparse network. For instance, a neuron capable of recognizing
facial images of human should never be triggered if the image seems to be of a structure
[31]. Consequently, when an input is given, just a small number of the nodes are not zero
(they are active), and a linear function shows every potential subset. This makes it possible
for gradients to flow more smoothly, which makes the process of training go faster.
Additionally, the ReLU is easier to figure out than the hyperbolic and exponential versions
[30]. In this thesis, ReLU is used as an activation function.
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3.3 Convolutional Neural Networks
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) were presented over two decades ago as a
version of vanilla MLPs that were modeled after the visual cortex of animals [32]. The
fundamental logic was that animals' visual cortex is composed of layers of simple and
complex cells, and as an image is processed via the cortex, increasingly rich features of the
image are discovered [33]. Pooling layers (complex cells) and convolutional layers (simple
cells) are form of CNNs and to train even high level and complex features, convolutional
layer filters have been used [28]. CNNs are designed specifically for processing grid-like
data including information such as one-dimensional audio signals, two-dimensional
images, and three-dimensional movies. Since the images are used in this thesis, a
discussion about images is presented:
An image is composed of pixels. Three color components: red, green, and blue make up each pixel in the RGB model. Each element's value is typically between 0 (no
color) and 255 (maximum saturation) [34]. Due to the higher cost of creating a color image
than a grayscale image, color photos have been transformed to grayscale images, for
example, in order to reduce the cost of generating low-cost edition books. Additionally, a
color-blind viewer must have a picture that is of the same quality as a color image in order
to interpret the information in the same way that a normal person does when viewing a
color image. Consequently, there are number of image processing applications that need to
change a color image to a grayscale image for different reasons [35]. If each Red, Green,
and Blue color has a value of 8 bits, then the RGB color space has a value of 24 bits and
provides 16,777,216 colors. A 24-bit representation of the color of a pixel in a color picture.
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The grayscale picture is represented by an 8-bit brightness value. The brightness of each
pixel in a grayscale image ranges from 0 to 255. In order to convert a color image to a
grayscale image, the RGB (24-bit) data must be converted to grayscale values (8 bit) [35].
Since the gray scale images are used in this thesis, one of the Far West Images in 2015 is
represented in the Figure 3-4. The details are provided in the data preparation section.
As it can be seen in Figure 3-5, the architecture of CNN is the typical for all models
[36].
To understand what a CNN is, it is necessary to first analyze the structure of a single
layer. In general, each layer of a CNN is composed of a collection of learnable "filters"
(which correspond to the network's weights), a non-linear threshold (similar to that found
in MLPs), and sometimes a pooling (also known as subsampling) operation.
Overall, after taking in a single input image, the model applies convolutional and
pooling layers to it before generating the output image through a sequence of fully
connected layers. These are described in the following subsections.
3.3.1 Convolutional Layers
A convolutional layer extracts features by convolving the input with a filter. This
produces a feature map suitable for training the networks. Simple shapes such as edges or
more sophisticated shapes such as structures are considered features. Convolution
techniques can be used to make convolutional layers that can be used to implement neural
networks to image data.
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Figure 3-4 One of the images that belongs to the Far West Station in 2015.

27

Figure 3-5 Typical CNN Architecture[36]
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Convolution is the key operation. In the presence of a 𝑛 𝑥 𝑛 filter (which is just a
weight matrix):
𝑤11
𝐹=[ ⋮
𝑤𝑛1

⋯ 𝑤1𝑛
⋱
⋮ ]
⋯ 𝑤𝑛𝑛

And an image’s 𝑛 𝑥 𝑛 patch:
𝑖11
𝐼=[ ⋮
𝑖𝑛1

⋯ 𝑖1𝑛
⋱
⋮ ]
⋯ 𝑖𝑛𝑛

The term "convolution" refers to the process of combining the filter and the picture
patch:
𝑛

𝑛

𝐹 ∗ 𝐼 = ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑘 𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑗=1 𝑘=1

Equation 3.3

The goal is to slide the filter over the image, convolving it with each patch of the
image as it does so. By selecting a stride, the amount of pixels moved may be changed by
the filter each time it slides (so with a stride of 1 the filter sees every possible patch of the
image). Each convolution generates an output, and the sum of all the outputs from a filter's
convolutions with an image generates a feature map, or the output of that layer that also
has a matrix structure.
In Figure 3-6, between a 3 by 3 section of the input image's matrix and a 3 by 3
filter matrix, a dot product convolution (called multiplication) is performed. The
components of the resultant matrix are combined, and the result is the output value of the
feature map ("destination pixel"). The input matrix is shifted over by the filter, which
performs the dot product convolution on every leftover combination of 3 by 3 sized areas,
29

Figure 3-6 It shows the 3x3 matrix multiplication.
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thus completing the feature map.
A concrete example will help to illustrate this process. The outcome of convolution
of a 3x3 filter is shown in portion of Figure 3-7 below:
1 0
𝐹 = [0 1
1 0

1
0]
1

1 1
𝐹 = [0 1
0 0

1
1] ,
1

With an image patch

As indicated on the feature map by
𝐅⋆𝐈 = 1∗1+1∗0+1∗1+0∗0+1∗1+1∗0+0∗1+0∗0+1∗1 = 4
Equation 3.4

The resulting feature map is then shown in section b of Figure 3-7 after the filter
is convolved across the full image.
The generated feature map is then subjected to a non-linear thresholding operation
by element. As with MLPs explained section 3.2 Multilayer Perceptron, the ReLU function
is the most frequently used threshold for CNNs. As a last step, the feature map is put
through a pooling process described in the following subsection.
3.3.2 Pooling Layer
Similar to the strides, pooling is another technique for lowering the dimensionality
of a layer, especially its height and width while conserving its depth. This is advantageous
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Figure 3-7 (a)The resulting the first convolution

(b)The result of the feature map

A convolution of an image with a filter is demonstrated [37].
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because it reduces the amount of CPU power necessary to analyze the data while still
extracting the most prominent characteristics from feature maps. This time, though, they
use simpler functions instead of an activation function, bias and weight to get the same
results. Pooling layers are classified into two types: maximum pooling and average
pooling. Maximum pooling layers are used in conjunction with convolutional layers to
enable down sampling of the feature maps obtained from the convolutions. Maximum
pooling is necessary to ensure that the model is resilient to the image content's position.
Pooling is typically 2 by 2 with a stride of 2, which means that it will take the maximum
value of each 2 by 2 patch in the feature map and move it two pixels at a time, returning a
collection of smaller feature maps.
The values that are contained within the patch for each channel are averaged out
when using the average pooling method. Pooling is commonly performed in 2 𝑏𝑦 2 patches
of a two-dimensional feature map with a stride of (2,2). Calculating the average for each
region of the feature map is considered pooling. This implies that each of the feature map's
2 𝑏𝑦 2 squares are down sampled to the square's average value. An example of maximum
and average pooling can be seen in the Figure 3-8 [38].
Both pooled and networks without pooling implement and regulate deformation
stability in large part due to the smoothness of learned filters [39]. Because of this reason
and since very large size images, for example millions of images, could not be provided,
it is not required to use a pooling layer for this thesis.
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Figure 3-8 Maximum and Average pooling example [38].
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3.3.3 Fully Connected Layer
As implied by the name, the previous layer's nodes need to be connected to the next
layer's nodes in order for the two to be fully connected. In order to construct the output
matrix, the input matrix must first be arranged in the form of a column vector. This column
vector is then put into a collection of layers that are fully connected to one another, which
means that classification occurs at fully connected layers [40].
Assume there are two sequential layers: 𝑙 (𝑘−1) ∈ ℝ𝑚

(𝑘−1) ×1

and 𝑙 (𝑘) ∈ ℝ𝑚

The weight matrix that links these layers would be written as 𝑤 (𝑘) ∈ ℝ𝑚

(𝑘−1) ×𝑚 (𝑘)

(𝑘)×1

.

to make

sure that they are all connected. Figure 3-9 illustrates this structure [40]
(𝑘)

The bias term (𝑏(𝑘) ∈ ℝ𝑚 ) is also included in most fully connected layers in
order to account for the constants of the system. Simply by applying weight and bias, a
fully connected layer’s output, 𝑜 (𝑘) , could be easily determined utilizing the layer function
𝜓 (𝐹𝐶) ,which is shown below.

(𝐹𝐶)

𝑜 (𝑘) = 𝜓(𝐾) (𝑜 (𝑘−1) ) = (𝑜(𝑘−1) )𝑇 𝑤 (𝑘) + 𝑏 (𝑘)
Equation 3.5
(𝐹𝐶)

𝜓(𝐾) ‘s computational complexity is
(𝐹𝐶)

𝒪(𝜓(𝐾) ) = 𝒪(𝑚(𝑘−1) 𝑚(𝑘) )
Equation 3.6
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Figure 3-9 A graph illustrating the connections between the two fully connected
layers[40].
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Activation functions (like tanh or ReLu explained under section 3.2) are applied to
each fully connected layer, while the output full connected layer is processed through
SoftMax. Before creating a final class output in the SoftMax layer, fully connected neural
networks are the fully connected layer that update weights between neurons.
3.3.3.1 Softmax Cross-Entropy
By using loss or cost function, the quality of an approximation can be quantified.
One way to better understand the idea of loss would be a salesperson’s loss. Considering a
customer paying a maximum of $20 for a particular product, should the salesperson sell
this item for $14, the salesperson loses $6 in potential profit. Or should the salesperson sell
this item for $24, the customer will not buy it and it costs the salesperson $20. In this case,
the salesperson’s objective would be to minimize the loss in order to maximize the profit.
One of the common loss functions is Softmax Cross-Entropy, which is described as when
two approximations are compared, the one with the lower loss performs better at
approximating the data. So, it is used to solve classification problems in which we are
attempting to determine which class our data belongs to. The Softmax Cross-Entropy
initially uses the input to determine the class probabilities. The definition of Softmax
Cross-Entropy is:
𝑝(𝑖|𝑦̂𝑛 ) =

𝑒 𝑦̂𝑛,𝑖
𝑦̂𝑛,𝑗
∑𝑁
𝑗=1 𝑒

Equation 3.7

Then it is compared to the expected output (𝑦𝑛 ∈ ℝ𝑁 ), the loss of Softmax CrossEntropy may be described by the Equation 3.8 [28]:
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𝑁

ℒ = 𝐶𝐸(𝑦̂𝑛 , 𝑦𝑛 ) = − ∑ 𝑦𝑛,𝑖 log(𝑝(𝑖|𝑦̂𝑛 ))
𝑖=1

Equation 3.8

In Softmax Cross-Entropy, the softmax is used to turn the outputs of the nodes into
probabilities. Therefore, it makes sense to use it for classification problems when the output
data reflects probability distribution [41]. GoodFellow et.al gives an in-depth description
of this technique [28].
3.3.3.2 Minimizing Loss
To get more accurate approximations, the parameters of the neural networks can be
optimized. One frequently used technique for optimizing these parameters is Adam, which
was introduced by Kingma et. al [42]. It is an optimization method that iteratively updates
network weights using training data. When the authors provide the algorithm, they also
detail the several advantages of utilizing Adam to solve non-convex optimization issues.
The approach is simple to develop, computationally efficient, requires minimal memory,
and is ideally suited for issues with a large amount of data and/or parameters. Adam is
quite simple to configure, with the default configuration parameters resolving most issues.
Additionally, the strategy is applicable to non-stationary targets and issues involving
extremely noisy and/or sparse gradients [42], which proves the success of the attacks used
in this thesis since the attack changes the gradient or makes the dataset noisy. Adam
optimizer employs a hybrid of two gradient descent algorithms:
•

Momentum
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This approach accelerates gradient descent by taking the 'exponentially weighted average'
of the gradients into account. If the averages are used, the algorithm moves faster toward
the minima which is the best solution.
𝑤𝑡+1 = 𝑤𝑡 − 𝛼𝑚𝑡
Equation 3.9

where,
𝛿𝐿
𝑚𝑡 = 𝛽𝑚𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝛽) [
]
𝛿𝑤𝑡
Equation 3.10

•

Root Mean Square Propagation (RMSP)

Tielemen and Hinton [43] introduced RMSP to accelerate mini-batch learning. The
learning rate in RMSP is adaptive depending on the moving average of the magnitudes of
previous gradients. In other words, RMSP computes a moving average of the squares of
the most current gradients, represented by (𝑣). As a result, recent gradients are given more
weight.
𝑤𝑡+1 = 𝑤𝑡 −

𝛼𝑡
1
(𝑣𝑡 + 𝜀)2

Equation 3.11

where,
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𝛿𝐿
∗[
]
𝛿𝑤𝑡

𝛿𝐿 2
𝑣𝑡 = 𝛽𝑣𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝛽) ∗ [
]
𝛿𝑤𝑡
Equation 3.12

That is, the next value of 𝑤 should be divided by the previous value of 𝑤 by moving
average of squares that have been squared recently for that parameter 𝑤, multiply it by 𝛼,
and then subtract it from the previous value of 𝑤.
Additionally, RMSP performs well with large and redundant datasets [44].

•

Mathematical Explanation of Adam Optimizer

Adam’s method updates the exponential moving averages of the gradient(mt) and
squared gradient(vt), which represent the first and second moment estimations,
respectively.
By simply combining these two formulas in above, Equation 3.13 and Equation
3.14 can be obtained. As seen below, the hyper-parameters 𝛽1 , 𝛽2 ∈ [0, 1] govern the
exponential decay rates of these moving averages:
𝛿𝐿
𝑚𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝑚𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝛽1 ) [
]
𝛿𝑤𝑡
Equation 3.13

𝛿𝐿 2
𝑣𝑡 = 𝛽2 𝑣𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝛽2 ) [
]
𝛿𝑤𝑡
Equation 3.14

Given that 𝑚𝑡 and 𝑣𝑡 which are first and second moment estimations, respectively
are both set to 0 (using the abovementioned approaches), it is seen that they have a tendancy
to be 'biased towards 0' when both 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 converge to 1 (𝛽1 & 𝛽2 ≈ 1). This optimizer
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corrects for this issue by computing 'bias-corrected' 𝑚
̂ 𝑡 and 𝑣̂𝑡 values. This is also done to
maintain control of the weights while attempting to approach the global minimum, hence
avoiding excessive oscillations when near it. The following formulas are used:
𝑚
̂𝑡 =

𝑚𝑡
1 − 𝛽1𝑡

𝑣̂𝑡 =

𝑣𝑡
1 − 𝛽2𝑡

Equation 3.15

Intuitively, the gradient descent algorithm can be adjusted after each iteration to
ensure that the process persists regulated and unbiased throughout. So, the bias-corrected
weight parameters can be used in place of the usual weight parameters. When these
parameters are incorporated into the general equation with updated parameters, we
obtained:
𝑤𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡−1 − 𝜂 (
Equation 3.16
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𝑚
̂𝑡
√𝑣̂𝑡 + 𝜀

)

CHAPTER FOUR DATA COLLECTION AND PREPARATION
4.1 Data Collection
There are two data sets utilized in this thesis that will be discussed in this part. The
selection of these data sets was based on their increasing complexity and is obtained from
the ERCOT website. The datasets are preprocessed to produce the adversarial images as
explained below.
The ERCOT region has eight stations, where two Far West and West regions are
chosen to implement CNN and the adversarial methodologies as discussed previously.
Each of these 5-year electrical data sets from 2015 to 2021 is considered as a signal and
these electrical data sets which are available on ERCOT website are converted into the
images.
Since the number of images is not required when taken on a monthly basis, and the
image sizes is very small when taken daily, they have therefore been taken on a weekly
basis. A weekly data set consists of 168 hourly datasets. 14𝑥12 images were created in
order to place the 168 rows of hourly data exactly in the image. Since the 1-year period
consists of 8784 hours of data, a total of 52 images with a size of 168 were created. While
a pixel represents a row of electrical data, Python programming and it’s libraries such as
Numpy are used to generate the pixels, which means that it is placed automatically by
code. The image values have been converted into (Numpy) arrays and colored images,
14𝑥12 size have been created as seen in Figure 4-1.
Since working with grayscale images is more convenient than (RGB) color images
and such a large size of the images would demand a considerable amount of processing
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Figure 4-1 Electric load data is converted to RGB model.
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time and these 24-by-24-pixel pictures already need far more processing power than the 8by-8-pixel images, so increasing their size will simply exponentially lengthen the duration
of the experiment, as explained under the Convolutional Neural Networks section, the RGB
24-bit images we obtain are converted to grayscale 8-bit images. Grayscale images have a
range of 0 to 255 for the brightness of each pixel. So, these values are scaled between 0
and 255 and as can be seen in Figure 4-2.
Hundreds of grayscale images, where the values are seen as similar and the actual
image is as given in Figure 4-3, are used to create the CNN model and to attack this image
data set in order to generate adversarial images. Since these obtained images are different
for each electrical data, they can be clearly noticed by deep learning models, although those
of the West and Far West stations are barely noticeable to the human eye. The West station
data is called 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 0, the Far West station data is 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 1 in order to be able to classify
and generate adversarial images from the created data set.
4.2 Convolutional Neural Networks Structure
The architectures of the convolutional neural networks used for each dataset are
described in this section and are shown in Figure 4-4. Each data set's neural network has
the same neural networks and there was a white-box attack on each data set's neural
network. This model is divided up by fundamental components that include convolutional
layers and fully connected layers. These are the most important components that go into
making up a convolutional neural network. A convolutional layer extracts features by
convolving the input with a filter. To train the network, a feature map is generated.
Structures and basic forms like edges are examples of features.
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Figure 4-2 The pixel values of a grayscale image are scaled from 0 to 255.
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Figure 4-3 One of the grayscale images belongs to the Far West Station in 2019.
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Input

Conv2D
3x16x3

ReLU
Conv2D
16x32x3

ReLU
Conv2D
32x64x3

ReLU
Fully Connected Layer
4x64x64,100

ReLU
Fully Connected Layer
100,10

Output
Figure 4-4 The architecture of the convolutional neural networks used in this thesis.
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Structures and basic forms like edges are examples of features. Deeper within a
convolutional neural network, more complicated characteristics are often extracted. In the
linear layers, which are fully connected neural networks, the weights between neurons are
modified before the softmax layer makes a final decision about the class.

As explained above, the inputs are normalized between 0 and 255. In addition to
the normalization of the input, Rectified Linear Activation Unit, or ReLU is used as the
activation function. This was selected based on claims that it can generate more accurate
and timely results than conventional activation functions [30]. As a result, for electrical
load data sets converted into images, the CNN structure is created with 30 epochs using 3
convolutional layers and 2 fully connected (linear) layers. The data of the West Station is
classified, 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 0 and the Far West Station is classified, 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 1 as outputs. We
successfully distinguish whether an image given to CNN belongs to 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 0 or 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 1.
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CHAPTER FIVE
EXPERIMENTATION RESULTS
In this research, some adversarial machine learning methods are used to show the
vulnerability of convolutional neural networks and compare the adversarial attacks on
CNN. To do that, as explained under the data preparation section, convolutional neural
networks is used, and adversarial images are generated by the adversarial methods and the
model is evaluated by using both attacked and normal data.

To train the model, every image is scaled to a value between 0 and 255 The neural
networks model is trained in 30 epochs and this network's learning rate was set incredibly
low, at 0.1%. Figure 5-1 illustrates this network's training process. The run achieves a high
accuracy on the training set. Observing the model, it is evident that the accuracy does
increase, reaching a peak of about 92% accuracy on the data set around the 30th epoch.
With the increasing importance of adversarial attacks, different methods have been
developed by researchers. ‘Torchattacks’ [45] which is a library for PyTorch [46] tool that
lets us use adversarial attacks to create new adversarial examples and that incorporates
many of the developed methods. All adversarial attacks were applied to two data sets in
order to show their successes on the vulnerability of Convolutional Neural Networks by
implementing this library, torchattacks. The same 𝜖 which is a literally small amount of
adversarial noise at 0.009% added to the images is used for all attacks and the same step
size, 20, -if attack has step size as a parameter- , is used for all of them, to get a fair
comparison. In Figure 5-2, the difference between clean data and attacked data can be seen,
by adding some perturbations to the clean image, the adversarial images are generated to
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Figure 5-1 The rates of training loss and accuracy have been achieved during the training
time of CNN.
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Figure 5-2 The difference between attacked and clean data.

51

manipulate the result of the classification.
First, the results were about the similar for PGD and FGSM, but as 𝜖 is increased,
the accuracy dropped much more quickly for PGD than for FGSM. This also shows that
PGD is a more powerful attack than FGSM as claimed. BIM also which is Iterative-FGSM
also affects accuracy more than the FGSM as expected. The results can be seen in the Table
5-1.
One Pixel change one of the pixels completely and the rate of the attack success is
expected to be higher than the others. For Sparse Fool attack, the low mean curvature of
the decision boundary is taken advantage of which means that this attack is based on
geometry and controls how sparse the perturbations are. Another attack, Deep Fool,
produces adversarial samples with fewer perturbations and greater rates of
misclassification than other approaches. Because one of the untargeted attacks is Deep
Fool, which is meaning of not pushing the input towards a particular class.
Since the authors motivate to generate an image with optimum and less detectable
perturbations, the result of Deep Fool also supports the claim.
Using TorchAttacks
Since TorchAttacks has been used for the experiment, it is important to underly
some advantages and disadvantages:
•

Lower-level operations such as multiplications for convolutions are not required to
be implemented. Because of this, we were able to work on more advanced
implementations like creating adversarial samples.
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Table 5-1 The accuracy of classification and the rate of success of the attacks on
Convolutional Neural Networks.
Attack Type

Standard Accuracy

Adversarial Accuracy

PGD Attack

93.41%

68.96%

FGSM Attack

90.50%

71.98%

Deep Fool

94.37%

32.42%

One Pixel

92.03%

24.59%

Sparse Fool

97.94%

64.71%

BIM

94.64%

71.21%
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•

Most operations work well on a wide range of platforms and devices. It would
demand a considerable processing time in order to optimize the model for the usage
of memory and processor, if the model was built in C++. In this situation, it would
take a lot of time to compare different methods and models.

•

It is complicated to alter existing operations and create one in TorchAttacks due to
the lack of documentation.

•

While implementing some attacks, we always face some errors. It is because their
parameters are different and had to be changed constantly during the training time.
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CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSION
With the convolutional neural networks model developed in this study, six
adversarial attacks were applied to the model and data set and the results were presented.
The creation of a deep learning model and the realization of adversarial attacks fall within
the scope of white-box attacks. The white-box PGD attack is the one that does the most
damage, which makes sense. It was made to be the ultimate first-order adversary, and
therefore the strongest white-box attack that has been published thus far. The white-box
FGSM attack comes in second, which is also expected. The white-box attack will always
be more powerful than others because it has access to the model's loss function and can
adjust the input to maximize the model's loss. All attacks also succeed in confusing the
model and causing it to misclassify, which also shows the vulnerability of Convolutional
Neural Networks. The existence of adversarial examples shows a vulnerability in the
viewpoint of convolutional neural networks. Modern CNNs can be tricked into making bad
decisions by making small changes to the inputs.
A successful offense necessitates an equally effective defense. For instance,
whenever an FGSM attack was implemented, the authors were inevitably testing their own
defense against an FGSM attack. When a defense is produced against an attack, another
attack that is a powerful attack emerges in order to break it. After that, a more powerful
defense is designed to mitigate the attack, and an even stronger attack suddenly arises to
break through this defense.
Since the FGSM, a great deal of progress has been made in the area of defenses and
adversarial attacks, and it would be beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss all these
developments. In the literature, there are some defense methods such as adversarial
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training, distillation, feature squeezing, ensemble methods, etc. Some of them can be
applied to the results of this thesis in the future. In addition to this, new mitigation strategies
and detection algorithms could be also studied for these attacks in the future.
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